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INCREASED RISK OF DISEASE FROM
HAZARDOUS WASTE: A PROPOSAL FOR
JUDICIAL RELIEF
Toxic substances have leached into ground water and dispersed through
the air from hazardous waste dumps across the country, posing significant
health risks to those living and working in surrounding communities.1
Congress has responded by enacting Superfund legislation2 to support a
massive clean-up program, and by adopting the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)3 to prevent continued abuses by hazardous
waste handlers. These efforts, however, do not address the legal barriers
that prevent adequate compensation for hazardous waste victims. 4
1. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY
552-53 (1984) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION]; see also Trauberman, Statutory
Reform of "Toxic Torts": Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 179-80 (1983). See generally J. BELFIGLIO, T. LIPPE & S. FRANKLIN,
HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL SITES (1981). For compilations of articles on the hazardous waste
problem, see SHOULD PRODUCERS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE BE LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR INJURIES
CAUSED BY THE WASTE, H.R. Doc. No. 93, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as
HAZARDOUS WASTE]; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE & AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, COURSE OF STUDY MATE-
RIALS-HAZARDOUS WASTE, SUPERFUND, AND Toxic SUBSTANCES (1984) [hereinafter cited as ALI-
ABA MATERIALS].
The hazardous waste problem is enormous. As many as 750,000 businesses generate an estimated
47.5 million metric tons of industrial waste per year. J. QUARLES, FEDERAL REGULATION OF HAZARDOUS
WASTES: A GUIDE TO RCRA 15 (1982), partially reprinted in HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra, at 8. Insecure
lagoons, ponds, and landfills hold as much as 90% of this waste. In addition, waste handlers have
dumped an unknown quantity of waste down sewers or along road beds. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
supra, at 554.
2. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA or Superfund), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982 & Supp. 11983). CERCLA includes a $1.6
billion fund to clean up hazardous waste sites. Five hundred and thirty-eight sites are currently on a
priority list to receive clean-up funds. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 app. B (1984); see Amendments to National
Oil and Hazardous Substances Contigency Plan, 49 Fed. Reg. 37,071 (1984). By 1986, 1400 to 2200
sites will require remedial action under CERCLA. Address by Gene A. Lucero, National Director of the
Environmental Protection Agency's Superfund Enforcement Program Office, Hazardous Waste Law
and Management Conference (October 20, 1984) (notes on file with the Washington Law Review).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1982 & Supp. 11983). The legislation provides for the management of
hazardous waste from "cradle to grave." See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 1, at 558-66.
Recent amendments to RCRA broaden the scope of the regulations and strengthen enforcement
capabilities. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221
(1984). See Shimberg, The Recycling, Incineration and Treatment Act of 1984, in ALI-ABA MATE-
RIALS, supra note I, at 175.
4. The first study documenting these barriers was the Six City Study. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
INSTITUTE FOR THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
SIX CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSATION FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES POLLUTION: ALABAMA, CALIFORNIA,
MICHIGAN, MISSOURI, NEW JERSEY, AND TEXAS (Comm. Print 1980). A second and broader study was
undertaken at the direction of Congress under § 301(e) of CERCLA. THE SUPERFUND SECTION 301(E)
STUDY GROUP FOR THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D
SESs., INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WAsTES-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL
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Persons exposed to hazardous wastes have an increased risk of develop-
ing cancer and other latent diseases. 5 Conclusive scientific evidence estab-
lishes this enhanced probability, 6 yet the judicial system bars recovery for
increased risk because the victims cannot prove the occurrence of these
diseases with reasonable medical certainty.7
Postponing legal action until a disease fully develops is not a viable
alternative. Statutes of limitation, 8 res judicata, 9 and proof of causation10
REMEDIES, (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as § 301(e) STUDY]. The § 301(e) STUDY identified
recurring problems involving statutes of limitation, apportionment of liability among defendants, and
proof of causation, that prevent hazardous waste victims from receiving adequate compensation. Id. at
43-71.
Several commentators have described the common law barriers to recovery for toxic waste related
injuries. See, e.g., Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminant
Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 881,886-91(1982); Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849, 855-59 (1984); Seltzer,
Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation: A Proposalfor Tort Reform, 10 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv.
797, 825-33 (1982-83); Trauberman, supra note 1, at 188-202; Comment, Judicial Attitudes Toward
Legal and Scientific Proof of Cancer Causation, 3 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 344 (1976).
The debate over compensation for toxic tort victims was the focus of a recent American Bar
Association conference. Recovery for Exposure to Hazardous Substances: The Superfund § 301(e)
Study and Beyond, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 10,098-111 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
COMPENSATION CONFERENCE]. The conference included papers on the obstacles to recovery for toxic
waste injuries as well as presentations by those who believe that barriers to legitimate recovery are the
exception, not the rule. See, e.g., Cheek, Why Current Victim Compensation Proposals are Unfair and
Ineffective, id. at 10,125; Corash, Evaluating the Effects ofAlternative Compensation Systems, id. at
10,122.
A few commentators have focused on problems of obtaining judicial relief prior to the onset of a
clinical injury. See, e.g., Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to
Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REv. 259, 261 (1960); Comment, Increased Risk of Cancer as an
Actionable Injury, 18 GA. L. Rev. 563 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Increased Risk]; Gale,
Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of Cancer: Elements of a Plaintiff's Case (August 8, 1984) (paper
delivered at American Bar Association 1984 Annual Meeting) (copy on file with the Washington Law
Review); Kanner, Handling Latent Injury Litigation (July 24, 1984) (paper delivered at Association of
Trial Lawyers of America 1984 Annual Convention) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
5. A variety of carcinogenic chemicals are present at toxic waste dumps across the country. See
Seltzer, supra note 4, at 798; see also Cordasco, Morgat, Beerel, Popovici & Murphy, Environmental
Aspects of Respiratory Cancer: Medical Legal Update, 29 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 229, 234-35 (1982)
(tables showing chemicals associated with the development of various cancers); SmRRA CLUB, POISONS
IN THE WATER: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND TOXIC DUMP CLEANUP 20-24 (1982) (tables showing
health effects of common ground water contaminants), partially reprinted in HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra
note 1, at 79-83.
6. There are a variety of methods to assess the risk of disease arising from exposure to toxic
substances. See infra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
8. In several states, plaintiffs' rights to sue for a latent injury will lapse before they know that a
remedy is available. Hathaway, Hazardous Substance Victims Need a Federal Cause of Action,
COMPENSATION CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 10,295; see also McGovern, The Status of Statutes of
Limitations and Statutes of Repose in Product Liability and Toxic Substance Litigation, in Toxic
SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 275 (Practising Law Institute, S. Birnbaum & P. Rheingold, co-chairpersons,
1982).
9. A court may characterize exposure to hazardous waste as a single cause of action. In that case, if
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preclude most plaintiffs from future damage recoveries. Fairness demands
an immediate remedy,'1  either by recognizing current physiological
damage caused by hazardous waste exposure as an actionable injury, 12 or
by accepting increased risk of disease as a separate cause of action.
This Comment addresses the need to provide adequate and present
remedies for individuals exposed to toxic wastes. Part I describes the
prevailing "reasonable medical certainty" rule and shows how it unjustly
prevents recovery by plaintiffs exposed to hazardous waste. Part II exam-
ines one method of avoiding the injustice of the "reasonable medical
certainty" rule. The adoption of an "extent of the injury" rule 3 would
allow courts to recognize genetic or cellular damage as injury, and provide
some hazardous waste victims with a remedy for their increased risk of
disease. In Part I a better solution is proposed-accepting increased risk
as an actionable injury. This approach, which will ensure recovery for all
hazardous waste victims, has several practical benefits and is supported by
existing legal doctrine. Finally, Part IV recommends two forms of judicial
relief, a damage award for probable out-of-pocket expenses, and court-
ordered purchase of insurance coverage for hazardous waste victims. An
insurance remedy is proposed because it is uniquely tailored to the in-
creased risk injury.
I. THE REASONABLE MEDICAL CERTAINTY RULE
Courts have adopted a variety of standards to prohibit speculation and
conjecture about future damages. 14 One widely followed standard is the
the plaintiff seeks present compensation for harm to private property, damage to a source of livelihood,
or acute personal injuries, res judicata will bar any future claim for damages incurred as a result of a
latent disease. See infra note 49; see also Outen, Injury from Hazardous Chemicals: Compensating
Innocent Bystanders, I ENviL. F. 6 (1983). Alternatively, if the plaintiff sues after a latent illness
develops, the statute of limitations on the other damage claims may have run.
10. One of the greatest barriers to recovery for hazardous waste victims who develop a disease is
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused the injury. See § 301(e) STUDY,
supra note 4, at 132; see also infra note 48. Legislative proposals have been made to ease this burden.
Light, A Comparison of the 301(e) Report and Some Pending Legislative Proposals, in COMPENSATiON
CoNwERFNcE, supra note 4, at 10,133. See generally Health Related Claims: Can the Tort and
Compensation Systems Cope?, 2 J. PROD. Ltha. 115 (1983) (compilation of articles delivered at
conference sponsored by National Legal Center for Public Interest).
11. Even if legislation eased the limitations on future recovery, there are several practical reasons
favoring a present claim for damages. See infra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
12. Courts have generally not recognized cellular and genetic damage caused by exposure to toxic
substances as recoverable injury. See Comment, Damages in Genetic Mutation and Chromosomal
Breakage: Tort Actions, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 105, 110-18 (1981); see also infra notes 29-37 and
accompanying text.
13. The extent of injury rule permits recovery for future damages that may develop as a result of a
present injury, but that cannot be proven as more likely than not to occur. See infra notes 24-26 and
accompanying text.
14. Annot., 75 A.L.R.3d 9, 17 (1977).
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reasonable medical certainty rule. Under this rule, courts compensate
plaintiffs with a ripe cause of action for prospective damages only if a
qualified medical expert can establish that the damages are reasonably
certain to accrue.15
The reasonable medical certainty principle presents a major obstacle to
hazardous waste victims seeking relief prior to the manifestation of a
clinically recognizable disease.16 Although various techniques are avail-
able to assess the likely effects of chemical inhalation and ingestion, 17
qualitative results from these assessments will seldom allow an expert to
predict with reasonable certainty that a cancer will develop. 18
Quantification of the risk19 will likewise be insufficient to prove damages
15. See 2 M. MINZER, J. NATEs, C. KIMBALL, D. AXELROD, & R. GOLDSTEIN, DAMAGES IN TORT
ACTIONS § 13.04 (1984) [hereinafter cited as M. MINZER]; 22 AM. JuLR. 2D Damages § 26(1965). There
is considerable confusion in the case law concerning the use of such terms as "reasonable certainty"
and "reasonable probability." Annot., 75 A.L.R.3d 9, 19 (1977); see Brachtenbach, Future Damages
in Personal Injury Actions-The Standard of Proof 3 GONZ. L. REv. 75, 77-84 (1968). This Comment
interprets "reasonable certainty" to mean more probable than not, as did the court in Wilson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
16. Seltzer, supra note 4, at 833. For example, in Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super.
561,461 A.2d 184, 186 (1983), plaintiffs were exposed to toxic substances released from the town dump
into community drinking water. Plaintiffs were unable to recover for their increased risk of cancer
because the future damages were considered too speculative. Id. at 187.
17. Experts use evidence from four types of studies to identify substances that may pose a risk of
cancer. First, there are epidemiological assessments. See WORK GROUP ON RISK ASSESSMENT, INTER-
AGENCY REGULATORY LIAISON GROUP (IRLG), SCIENTIFIC BASES FOR IDENTFICATION OF POTENTIAL
CARCINOGENS AND ESTIMATION OF RISKS, 44 Fed. Reg. 39,858, 39,861-62 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
IRLG REPORT]; Gample & Battigelli, Epidemiology, in 1 PATTY'S INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE AND Tox-
ICOLOGY 113 (3d ed. 1978); see also Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in
Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 429, 433-34 (1983) (technical and practical
problems limit the usefulness of epidemiolgical data). Second, experts may rely on animal bioassays.
See IRLG REPORT, supra, at 39,862-69; Casarett, Toxicologic Evaluation, in TOxICOLOGY: THE BASIC
SCIENCE OF POISONS 20 (1975). Also, short term microorganism or cell culture tests are used. See IRLG
REPORT, supra, at 39,869-70; see also Hoffman & Wynder, Organic Particulate Pollutants-Chemical
Analysis and Bioassaysfor Carcinogenicity, in 3 AIR POLLUTION 423-55 (A. Stern ed. 3d ed. 1977).
Finally, experts may use chemical structural analysis to identify potentially carcinogenic substances.
See IRLG REPORT, supra, at 39,870.
18. Evidence from studies described supra note 17 provides a qualitative assessment of the
potential toxic properties of a substance without quantifying the risk imposed on exposed individuals.
IRLG REPORT, supra note 17, at 39,860. This information will not provide an expert with sufficient
evidence to state with reasonable certainty that an exposed group of persons will develop cancer.
19. A quantitative risk assessment applies the results of the hazard evaluation described supra note
17 to the specific population exposed. See Houk, Determining the Impact on Human Health Attribut-
able to Hazardous Waste Sites, in RISK ASSESSMENT AT HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 21, 29 (1982). First, a
dose response relationship is established. See IRLG REPORT, supra note 17, at 39,873. Second, the
magnitude and duration of the community's exposure is evaluated, Id. at 39,873-75. Finally, the dose
response model is applied to calculate the exposed individuals' risk of developing a latent disease.
While quantitative risk assessment involves various uncertainties, id. at 39,871, it is used by a number
of regulatory agencies including the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Food and Drug Admin-
istration, and Occupational Safety and Health Administration. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK
ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 40-41, 93-131 (1983).
Risk of Disease from Hazardous Waste
under the reasonable medical certainty standard because the probability of
developing a future disease is unlikely to exceed fifty percent.20 Courts
applying the reasonable medical certainty standard equate a forty-nine
percent chance of disease formation with speculation, yet treat a fifty-one
percent probability as reasonably certain. 2 ' This arbitrary result fails to
recognize the scientific certainty of quantitative risk assessment.22 It un-
justly denies immediate relief to everyone in the exposed population for
their increased risk, even though a certain number of persons will develop a
disease. 23
In light of the degree of certainty by which increased risk of disease from
exposure to toxic wastes can be established, application of the reasonable
medical certainty rule is no longer justified. Alternative doctrines must be
found that adequately compensate hazardous waste victims while prevent-
ing speculation and limitless liability.
II. THE EXTENT OF THE INJURY RULE
One means of avoiding the harsh results of the medical certainty rule is
through application of a standard based on the "extent of the injury." 24 The
extent of the injury doctrine, adopted by a growing number of jurisdic-
tions, 25 allows a plaintiff to recover damages for future illnesses that may
20. Even for those toxic substances that have the strongest association between exposure and
disease formation, the absolute risk of disease development is far less than 50%. Forexample, there is a
strong association between exposure to asbestos and development of mesothelioma. Black & Lilien-
feld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732,758 (1984) (relative risk
for developing mesothelioma from asbestos exposure is 50-80 compared with 10 for most diseases;
relative risk is the ratio of the incidence rate of disease in the exposed group divided by that rate in the
non-exposed "control" group). However, the risk of developing the mesothelioma is less than 50%. See
Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 120 & n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (15% of asbestosis
sufferers later contract mesothelioma).
21. Brachtenbach, supra note 15, at 85.
22. Statistical significance testing enables an investigator to determine if an increased risk, no
matter how small, is truly due to chemical exposure. See Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 22, at 757 n. 104
(citing I. Hacking, LOGIC OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE (1965)).
23. Suppose, for example, that 1,000 persons in a community were exposed to a chemical released
from the local dump. Using evidence developed from epidemiological studies on other populations
exposed to the chemical, a quantitative risk assessment might conclude that the exposed persons have an
increased I in 50 chance of developing a particular cancer. Thus, 20 additional persons would be
expected to develop cancer, although the victims could not yet be identified. Because the individual risk
is only 2%, no person could be compensated under the reasonable medical certainty rule.
Ironically, plaintiffs may have a better chance of recovering damages if they eschew statistics. Courts
will often uncritically accept a witness' expressed opinion of certainty without demanding statistical
evidence. See, e.g., Cox v. Ulysses Coop. Oil & Supply Co., 218 Kan. 428, 544 P.2d 363, 369-70
(1975); Pucci v. Rausch, 51 Wis. 2d 513, 187 N.W.2d 138, 141-42 (1971); see also Rosenberg, supra
note 4, at 869-77.
24. See M. MiNZER, supra note 15, at § 13.02; Wolfstone & Wolfstone, Damages for Increased
Likelihood of Illness and Disability, in 1977 PERSONAL INJURY ANNUAL 313.
25. In 1963, six states applied the extent of the injury standard. Brachtenbach, supra note 15, at
639
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result from present injury, but that are not reasonably likely to develop.
Present injury must still be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, but
plaintiffs need only establish with reasonable certainty their enhanced risk
of disease formation. 26
To date, courts have applied the extent of the injury rule only where gross
physical injuries have occurred. 27 Exposure to hazardous waste, however,
does not result in such apparent physical trauma. 28 For this rule to be
applicable in the hazardous waste context, courts must recognize genetic or
cellular damages as present injury. 29
86-88 (California, Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania). Since then,
some form of the standard has also been applied in: Illinois, Lindsay v. Applety, 91111. App. 3d 705,414
N.E.2d 885,891(1980); Kentucky, Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928,932 (Ky. 1984); Oregon, Feist v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 Or. 402, 517 P.2d 675, 679 (1973); and in three federal circuit courts,
Martin v. City of New Orleans, 678 F.2d 1321, 1324, 1326 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203
(1983); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 720 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982);
Traylor v. United States, 418 F.2d 262, 264 (6th Cir. 1969).
26. Plaintiffs often present statistical evidence to show increased risk. See, e.g., McCall v. United
States, 206 F. Supp. 421, 426 (E.D. Va. 1962) (3-25% possibility of future epilepsy); Schwegel v.
Goldberg, 209 Pa. Super 280, 228 A.2d 405, 408 (1967) (child who fractured skull had one chance in
twenty of developing seizures). Some courts require statistical evidence. See, e.g., Martin v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 322 Pa. Super. 348,469 A.2d 655, 658 n.2 (1983). However, a numberof courts have
awarded damages based on expert opinion that the future consequences were "possible" or "likely."
See, e.g., Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928, 929, 932 (Ky. 1984) (future development of spinal
meningitis is proper element of damage award even if expert can only say plaintiff may possibly suffer
this complication); Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 Or. 402, 517 P.2d 675, 679 (1973).
27. Many cases involve skull fractures leading to an increased risk of epilepsy or spinal meningitis.
See, e.g., McCall v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 421, 426 (E.D. Va. 1962); Davis v. Graviss, 672
S.W.2d at 929; Feist v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 517 P.2d at 679; Schwegel v. Goldberg, 209 Pa. Super.
280, 228 A.2d 405,408 (1967); compare Martin v. City of New Orleans, 678 F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir.
1982) (bullet in neck might lead to a paralyzing infection). cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); Starlings
v. Ski Roundtop Corp., 493 F. Supp. 507, 510 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (knee injury might result in degenerative
arthritis).
28. Acute human health impacts from exposure to toxic substances are possible where a major
accident releases large concentrations of chemicals. The most extreme example is the recent disaster in
Bhopal, India. Iyer, India's Night ofDeath, TIME, Dec. 17, 1984, at 22. Continual contact with certain
chemicals may also cause acute skin diseases. Birmingham, Occupational Dermatoses, in I PArrY's
INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE AND ToxICOLOGY 203 (3d ed. 1978). Of concern here, however, are the potential
long-term effects of exposure to hazardous wastes on the respiratory, nervous, alimentary, and
urological systems, as well as the possible development of cancer, infant deformity, and permanent
genetic impairment. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 1, at 553; Casarett, supra note 17, at
11.
29. Courts in the past have not considered the cellular and chromosomal damage that occurs at the
earliest stages of disease formation to be actionable injury because it was not detectable and its
relationship to future illness was not fully appreciated. See Comment, supra note 12, at 110-14. Instead,
many courts have preserved a plaintiff's cause of action arising out of exposure to toxic substances
through the discovery rule. See, e.g., Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169 (1949) (to measure the
plaintiff's disease from a specific moment of contact with the toxin would charge the plaintiff "with
knowledge of. . . a disease whose symptoms had not yet obtruded on his consciousness"). However,
given our improved scientific understanding of latent diseases, see Weisburger, Chemical Car-
cinogenesis, in ToxICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 333 (1975); see also infra note 30, these
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Chromosomal changes indicative of increased cancer risk are detectable
through various techniques. 30 One test involves microscopic inspection of
human cells for chromosomal aberrations. 31 Another test identifies im-
proper exchanges of genetic material between complementary chro-
mosomal strands. 32 A third test quantifies the DNA adducts that are created
subclinical effects must be regarded as compensable.
Some courts have approved the use of subclinical effects to show injury. In Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc. v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980), the
plaintiff challenged EPA's use of elevated blood lead concentrations (EP levels) as a basis for setting the
national ambient air quality standard for lead because these effects were only subclinical. The court
reponded:
[D]escribing a particular effect as a "subclinical" effect in no way implies that it is improper to
consider it adverse to health. While EP elevation may not be readily identifiable as a sign of
disease, the Administrator properly concluded that it indicated a lead-related interference with
basic biological functions. . . [T]he modem trend in preventive medicine is to detect health
problems in their "subclincial" stages, and thereupon to take corrective action.
Id. at 1158 (footnotes omitted). Although this decision is not in a tort litigation context, the court's
reasoning supports the conclusion that subcellular damage caused by toxic substances should be
considered recoverable injury. Alleged chromosomal damage was sufficient injury to go to trial in
Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14, 17-18 (D. Colo. 1984) (radiation injury from uranium
tailings), and In re Three Mile Island Litigation, No. 79-0763 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 1982), summarized in
26 ATLA L. REP. (Ass'n Trial Law. Am.) 212 (1983).
30. Scientists have developed means of detecting changes in human chromosome structure that
may indicate increased likelihood of cancer development. Comment, Occupationally Induced Cancer
Susceptibility: Regulating the Risk, 96 HARv. L. REv. 697, 697 (1983). Although the process by which
normal cells transform into a tumor is not completely understood, an initiator-promoter model has been
used to explain the mechanism of carcinogenesis. Under this simplified scheme, a carcinogen reacts
with specific tissue receptors, resulting in a permanent aberration of several cells. These so-called
dormant or latent tumor cells are stimulated into growth by other chemicals known as promoters or co-
carcinogens. After a sufficient number of multiplications, a tumor is visible. See Weisburger, supra
note 29, at 353-55.
The alteration of cells that begins the carcinogenic process most likely involves changes in genetic
material. Id. at 362. Studies on the effects of ionizing radiation have revealed a correlation between
damaged chromosomes and increased incidence of cancer. Maugh, Biological Markers for Chemical
Exposure, 215 Sci. 643,643 (1983). For a discussion of the effects of radiation on human cells, see A.
CASARETT, RADIATION BIOLOGY 90-117 (1968). A similar, but less potent process of chromosomal
damage occurs with chemical carcinogenesis. Telephone interview with Alan S. Levin, M.D.,
immunologist specializing in chemically induced cellular damage (Nov. 5, 1984) [hereinafter cited as
Levin] (notes on file with the Washington Law Review). For an excellent discussion of cancer from a
geneticist's viewpoint, see L WATSON, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 558-628 (1970).
31. Chromosome aberrations involve breaks in whole chromosomes that may, after cell replica-
tion, be rejoined incorrectly, remain broken, or be lost. Maugh, supra note 30, at 643. For a description
of various types of chromosomal aberrations, see A. CASARETr, supra note 30, at 99-115.
32. These exchanges are known as Sister Chromatid Exchanges (SCE's). Although SCE's have
been induced in cultured cells by known chemical carcinogens, the relationship of SCE's to illness is
more tenuous than chromosomal aberrations. Maugh, supra note 30, at 644.
Chromosomal aberrations and SCE's have been used for assessing cancer risks in populations
exposed to toxic substances. See, e.g., Heath, Nadel, Zack, Chen, Bender, & Preston, Cytogenetic
Findings in Persons Living Near the Love Canal, 251 J.A.M.A. 1437, 1438 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Heath]. Genetic testing is also performed to screen workers for susceptibility to cancer and for evidence
of exposure. Comment, supra note 30, at 697.
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when a carcinogen binds to the DNA molecule. 33 The presence of specific
DNA adducts provides incontrovertible evidence of the subject's exposure
to carcinogenic chemicals and increased risk of cancer.34
Scientists also suspect damage to the immune system in the formation of
cancer and other latent diseases. 35 Environmental contaminants can cause
immunodysfunction. 36 Scientists have diagnosed immunological injury in
persons exposed to toxic substances and have assessed their risks of future
disease.37
Cytogenetic tests on persons living near hazardous waste sites may prove
with reasonable certainty that the chemicals released from the site have
damaged their chromosomes or immune systems. Such bodily effects
clearly demand recognition as actionable injury. Courts should treat bro-
ken chromosomes no differently than broken bones. The difference be-
tween cellular injury and injury to a leg or arm lies only in the ease of
detectability and the degree of trauma, not in the fact of injury.
Acceptance of cellular damage as a present cause of action will enable
plaintiffs to receive compensation for the full extent of the injury. Under the
extent of the injury rule, hazardous waste victims who have discovered
genetic or immunological injury should recover for the possibility of
developing future diseases.
Recognizing the earliest stages of disease formation as actionable injury
need not bar claims by persons who do not undergo cytogenetic testing and
yet develop an exposure-related disease. Jurisdictions that apply the discov-
ery rule should find that cellular damage is not a reasonably discoverable
injury, 38 thereby preserving claims until an exposure-related disease
33. The formation of a DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) adduct is a crucial step in the development of
carcinogenesis and mutagenesis. Maugh, Tracking Exposure to Toxic Substances, 226 Sc. 1183, 1183
(1984).
34. Id. at 1183-84.
35. Research to clarify the suspected role of depressed immune function in chemical car-
cinogenesis is being performed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. S. WINSLOW, THE EFFECTS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS ON THE IMMUNE SYSTEM: A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS 26
(1981); see also Rea & Mitchell, Chemical Sensitivity and the Environment, 157 IMMUN. ALLERGY
PRAC. 21, 21 (1982).
36. Silkworth & Loose, Assessment of Environmental Contaminant -Induced Lymphocyte Dys-
finction, 39 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 105, 105 (1981).
37. Roisman, Common Law Toxic Tort Litigation: Strengths, Weaknesses, Reforms, Alternatives
6 (June 21, 1984) (paper delivered at Washington State Trial Lawyers Association conference on Toxic
Torts) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review); Levin, supra note 30. The immunological tests
performed by Dr. Levin are described in McGovern, Lazaroni, Saifer, Levin, Rapp & Gardner, Clinical
Evaluation of the Major Plasma & Cellular Measures ofImmunity, 12J. ORTHOMOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY
60 (1983).
38. Under the discovery rule, "the cause of action does not accrue until the injury is discovered or
in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been discovered." Borel v. Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp.. 493 F.2d 1076, 1102 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
A few jurisdictions follow the exposure rule, measuring accrual of a cause of action from the time the
Vol. 60:635, 1985
Risk of Disease from Hazardous Waste
actually develops. Standard clinical examinations seldom include tests for
immunodysfunction, even if the doctor knows of the patient's exposure to
toxic substances. 39 Cytogenetic evaluation requires carefully controlled
studies using analytical techniques not available in most laboratories. 40
Thus, under the extent of the injury rule, persons exposed to hazardous
wastes would have a choice. They could delay suit until manifestation of a
latent disease. Their cause of action would be preserved because the
cellular injuries were neither discovered nor reasonably discoverable. Al-
ternatively, they could undergo cytogenetic testing. If the results were
negative, they could postpone legal action.41 If injuries were discovered,
they would have a fixed period in which to initiate a lawsuit for future
damages.
Although the extent of the injury doctrine applied in conjunction with
cellular injury avoids the harsh results of the reasonable medical certainty
rule, the approach only benefits those who demonstrate present phys-
iological damage. For others who are at risk of developing future diseases,
yet whose cytogenetic tests prove negative, 42 this solution is ineffectual.
Adequate relief for all hazardous waste victims compels recognition of
increased risk by itself as an actionable injury.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE-INCREASED RISK AS RECOVERABLE
INJURY
The best means of providing immediate relief for persons exposed to
toxic wastes is through an "increased risk of disease" cause of action. An
offending substance invades the body. See, e.g., Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242,
247 (App. Div. 1984). In these jurisdictions, recognizing cellular damage as injury will not change the
exposure rule's harsh results. By adopting the extent of the injury rule, however, these jurisdictions
could provide adequate relief for those persons forced to sue immediately upon exposure.
A similar situation would exist in states following the "disease manifestation" rule, where the statute
of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff first has a medically provable injury. See Note, Preserving
Causes of Action in Latent Disease Cases: The Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp. Date-of-the-Injury
Accrual Rule, 68 VA. L. REv. 615, 615 (1982).
39. Only a limited number of specialists apply the sophisticated principles of immunodysfunction
testing to the treatment of non-allergic diseases such as cancer. Levin, supra note 30.
40. The Centers for Disease Control's follow-up assessment at Love Canal was a carefully
controlled cytogenic study. Wolff, Love Canal Revisited, 251 J.A.M.A. 1464 (1984). Cell specimens
were sent to Brookhaven National Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory for cell culture,
harvesting, fixation, staining, and aberration identification. Heath, supra note 32, at 1438.
41. The lack of present chromosomal or immunological damage does not rule out the possibility
that tested persons will develop cancer or other latent diseases as a result of exposure to hazardous
substances. Heath, supra note 32, at 1440; sbe also Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 514 F.2d 492, 515 (8th Cir. 1975), modified sub nom. Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F. 2d
181 (8th Cir. 1976) (discussing inconclusive nature of negative results from tissue study). Plaintiffs may
still prove the increased risk of cancer using the risk assessment techniques described supra notes
17-19.
42. See supra note 41.
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increased risk claim offers several practical benefits and is supported by
existing legal doctrine.
A. Practical Benefits
Because of the pragmatic problems of future recovery, persons exposed
to hazardous wastes cannot wait until a disease has developed to seek
judicial relief. In many jurisdictions, statutes of limitation will have run
long before manifestation of a disease. 43 Even in jurisdictions where the
discovery rule theoretically preserves hazardous waste victims' causes of
action, future compensation is doubtful. Critical evidence of exposure and
tortious conduct often disappears when plaintiffs are forced to wait years to
litigate. 44 The chances of identifying liable parties also decreases over time
as those responsible for mishandling wastes abandon sites, 45 sell to other
parties, 46 or file for bankruptcy. 47
Where evidence is preserved and defendants are located, plaintiffs still
face the enotmous burden of proving that the defendants caused the
manifested disease. 48 In addition, res judicata may completely bar a future
43. See supra notes 8, 38.
44. Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 920 (delay in resolving the issue of liability may result in loss or
degradation of evidence). Many actions for occupational cancer have failed when the plaintiff was
unable to prove the magnitude of exposure. Comment, Tort Actions for Cancer: Deterrence, Compen-
sation, and Environmental Carcinogenesis, 90 YALE.L.J. 840, 851-52 & n.54 (1981).
45. A number of waste dumps are considered "orphan" sites. It is unknown who operated or used
them. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 1, at 567. While those responsible for some sites will
never be located, earlier litigation will improve the chances for finding culpable parties.
46. Potential corporate defendants may be sold or reorganized, Landau, Hurdling the Barriers to
Toxic Tort Recovery, TRIAL, Apr. 1983, at 40, 41, or the dump site may be sold to an innocent purchaser.
See Bleicher & Stonelake, Caveat Emptor: The Impact of Superfund and Related Laws on Real Estate
Transactions, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,017, 10,017 (1984).
47. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note I, at 566; Note, The Manville Bankruptcy:
Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1121-22 (1983).
For these same reasons, an earlier suit would help a liable defendant obtain contribution while other
responsible parties can be located and are not judgment-proof.
48. There are two types of causation problems for the toxic tort plaintiff. First, an indeterminant
defendant problem exists when it is unclear which one of several defendants caused the plaintiff's harm.
This problem has been addressed by courts through a variety of techniques. See, e.g., Hall v. E.I.
Dupont DeNemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 376-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (enterprise liability); Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.3d 588, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145,607 P.2d 924, 937 (market share theory).
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly Co., 418 Mich. 311,343 N.W.2d 164,170-73 (1984)
(alternative liability).
Second, the problem of an indeterminant plaintiff is present when the origin of the plaintiff's illness
cannot be linked to the defendant's conduct. This is particularly difficult where there are both natural
and chemical causes of the manifested disease. Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 856-57; see also In re
"Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, M.D.L. No. 381, slip op. at 269-97 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25,
1984) (preliminary memorandum and order on settlement). The courts have not provided relief to
indeterminant plaintiffs. Delgado, supra note 4, at 908. But see Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp.
247, 415 (D. Utah 1984) (burden of proving causation shifted to defendant after threshold showing by
plaintiffs).
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lawsuit if the plaintiff had brought an earlier action to recover other
damages from exposure.49
Even those who never develop a latent disease suffer an immediate loss
and deserve compensation for the increased medical costs of monitoring for
early signs of disease formation. 50 Because a defendant cannot be liable for
damages without causing injury, courts must recognize increased risk as
the underlying injury.5'
Increased risk recovery also serves the tort goal of deterrence. 52 Potential
lawsuits far in the future will not deter mishandling of hazardous wastes. 53
Immediate liability most effectively influences present conduct and pre-
vents further health and environmental damage.
B. Supporting Legal Doctrine
In addition to the practical benefits, recognition of the increased risk
claim comports with existing tort principles. A number of analogous legal
doctrines support judicial relief for the increased risk victim.
49. Courts following the modem "transactional" definition of a cause of action will likely preclude
the future litigation. See RESTATEMEr (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENrs § 61(1) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978) (prior
judgment extinguishes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to the
transaction out of which the action arose). A present cause of action extends to future increased risk of
damages. Id. at § 61(1) comment c. Compare Carbonaro v. Johns-Manville Corp., 526 F. Supp. 260,
262-63 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (claim for mesothelioma barred by adjudication of prior complaint for
asbestosis), aff'd, 688 F.2d. 819 (3d Cir. 1982) with Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F2d
111, 117-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (recognizing separate cause of action for present disease of asbestosis and
future disease of mesothelioma arising from same exposure).
50. Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 885. The victim's discounted life prospects and increased
insurance premiums are also a present loss. Id. at 886; see also Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law
Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 859, 924 (1981).
51. Most courts that permit jury awards to include the expected medical costs of future diagnostic
testing require proof ofa present injury. See, e.g., Coover v. Painless Parker, Dentist, 105 Cal. App. 110,
286 P. 1048, 1050 (1930) (present x-ray bums may lead to cancer); see also Mink v. University of
Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 719-20 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (denying medical monitoring costs for DES
(diethylstilbestrol) daughters because no disease present).
In Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561,461 A.2d 184, 190 (1983), the court permitted
medical monitoring costs for early detection of cancer in persons exposed to hazardous wastes. The
court reasoned that tortfeasors should bear the cost of medical testing required by their tortious conduct.
Id. While policy reasons amply justify this conclusion, the court failed to reconcile its holding with the
lack of present injury. The logical implication from the opinion is that the New Jersey court did
recognize increased risk of cancer as the underlying injury, but permitted recovery only for those future
damages proven to be reasonably certain to accrue.
52. The purpose of remedial tort actions includes compensation, deterrence and retribution. See
Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An EssayforHarry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REv.
69, 77 (1975); Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARv. L. REv. 72, 72 (1942).
53. Executives responsible for a corporation's tortious conduct are likely to be more concerned
about the firm's short-term profit than about remote and contingent disease claims that may only
confront their managerial successors. Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 920; see also Cheek, supra note 4, at
10,124 (opposing administrative victim compensation proposals because they destroy incentives of tort
system).
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Loss of chance cases represent one supporting doctrine. 54 For example, a
recent loss of chance decision held a physician liable for negligently
decreasing a patient's chance of survival, even though that chance was
already less than fifty percent. 55 Such recognition of increased risk as
injury applies directly in a hazardous waste context. Under the loss of
chance principle, persons who prove that exposure to toxic substances
caused an increased risk of death or disease merit judicial relief.56
Market share liability provides a further basis for granting increased risk
claims. 57 Courts applying this theory justify imposing liability on manufac-
turers who may not have caused the plaintiffs' injury on the ground that all
defendant manufacturers have contributed to the risk of injury to the
public. 58 Courts have also noted that without market share liability, an
innocent plaintiff would be deprived just compensation. 59
The market share reasoning supports the increased risk claims of haz-
ardous waste victims. The tortious conduct of the hazardous waste handler
increases the plaintiffs' probability of injury, just as defendant manufac-
turers in market share cases have increased the risk of disease in the
consuming public. Whereas the market share theory is concerned with
uncertainty as to which defendant injured the plaintiffs, the hazardous
54. In loss of chance cases, plaintiffs cannot trace causation of their injuries to the defendant, but
are permitted to recover if they can show that the defendant's actions made a bad situation worse.
Delgado, supra note 4, at 889.
55. Herskovits v. Group Health, 99 Wn. 2d 609, 664 P.2d 474 (1983). In Herskovits, expert
testimony indicated that the doctor's negligent diagnosis had decreased the plaintiff's chance of
surviving his lung cancer from 39% to 25%. Id. at 612,664 P.2d at 475. A fourjustice plurality held that
the 14% increased risk of death was recoverable injury. Id. at 634, 664 P.2d at 487; see Note, Recovery
for "Loss of Chance" in a Wrongful Death Action, 59 WASH. L. REV. 981 (1984). Other jurisdictions
have made similar loss of chance decisions. See, e.g., Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th
Cir. 1966); Roberson v. Counselman, 235 Kan. 1006, 686 P.2d 149, 159-60 (1984); Kallenberg v. Beth
Israel Hosp., 45 A.D.2d 177. 357 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510 (1974), aff'd, 37 N.Y.2d 719, 337 N.E.2d 128.
374 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1975).
56. At least one court has recognized the possibility of such a claim. In re Kitsap County Asbestos
Cases of Schroeter, Goldmark and Bender, No 81-2-00940-1, slip op. at 2-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. Kitsap
County June 6, 1983) (denying a defendant's motion in limine to preclude discussion of future cancer in
asbestosis cases).
57. The market share theory of liability was first applied in California. Sindell v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 145 (litigation involving DES), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). The market share theory is based on the classic case of Summers v. Tice.
33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter
should bear the cost of the injury). A number of jurisdictions have adopted some form of the market
share theory. See, e.g., Copeland v. Celotex Corp., 447 So. 2d 908, 915 (Fla. App. 1984) (asbestos
litigation); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311,343 N.W.2d 164 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 123
(1984); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wn. 2d 581, 603, 689 P.2d 368, 381-82 (1984); Collins v.
Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, 53 (1984).
58. See, e.g., Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wn. 2d 581, 604, 689 P.2d 368, 382 (1984).
Defendants are only held responsible for the harm that-they statistically could have caused. Id. at 606,
689 P.2d at 383.
59. See, e.g., id. at 604, 689 P.2d at 382.
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waste problem involves uncertainty of future disease. In both, statistical
evidence can be used to avoid the harsh results of traditional tort doctrine
and impose liability on those who have acted wrongfully.
Legal precedent involving anticipatory nuisance law60 and environmen-
tal endangerment statutes61 furnishes additional support for recognizing
increased risk claims. Courts have ordered plant closures or installation of
pollution control devices when the risk of injury to the public is less than
fifty percent. 62 The factors supporting equitable relief in these cases
equally support compensation for increased risk. Uncertainty of future
harm to the plaintiff and potential economic burden to the defendant are
similar in equitable and compensation contexts. It is incongruous to order a
hazardous waste facility to spend millions of dollars reducing exposure to
the surrounding community while denying compensation to those at risk of
developing disease long after the clean-up has ended. 63
By relying on these precedents, courts can recognize a new cause of
action for increased risk without reaching far beyond existing legal doc-
trine.64 This approach will prevent continued unjust treatment of hazardous
60. See, e.g., Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824, 842
(1981) (Ryan, J., concurring) (granting injunctive relief even though the possibility of the harmful result
is uncertain or contingent); see also W. ROGERs, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.4 (Supp. 1984).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974) (suit under
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1972) (omitted from current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1151-1376 (1982))), modified sub nom. Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 514 F2d492 (8th Cir. 1975), modifiedsubnom. Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181(8th
Cir. 1976); Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 12-13 (D.C. Cir.) (challenging
regulation adopted under the Clean Air Act, § 211(c)(1)(A), current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(1982
& Supp. 11983)), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
62. Reserve Mining v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d at 536-37 (pollution control
actions required although no finding of imminent or probable harm), modified sub nom. Reserve Mining
Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976); Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d at
17-20 (authorizing EPA to regulate gasoline additives that may present a less than probable risk of
harm).
63. For example, In Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824,
836-37 (1981), the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a lower court injunction requiring the closure of a
hazardous waste disposal site that might release toxins into the environment. If persons living in
Wilsonville had been exposed to toxic waste and had sought damages for their increased risk of
developing cancer, the court would most likely have denied them relief. See Seltzer, supra note 4, at
840-41; see also Comment, The Burden of Proof in Environmental and Public Health Litigation, 49
UMKC L. REv. 207, 208-09 (1981).
64. Some courts are concerned that increased risk recovery will lead to a flood of litigation. See,
e.g., Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 461 A.2d 184, 187 (1983). This fear is
unwarranted. The risks imposed on persons each day will rarely lead to actionable injuries. See
Comment, Increased Risk, supra note 4, at 564-67. Courts can also require statistical proof to prevent
purely speculative claims. See, e.g., Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 322 Pa. Super. 348, 469 A.2d
655,657 n.2. (1983). Increased risk recovery will actually improve judicial efficiency because the same
evidence needed to establish an increased risk claim will be presented to establish emotional distress
claims. See, e.g., Arnett v. Dow Chemical Co., No. 729586, slip op. at 24-26 (Cal. Super. Ct. San
Francisco County Mar. 21, 1983).
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waste victims and achieve the tort system's goal of compensation and
deterrence. 65 Allowing present relief for increased risk should not preclude
claims by those who wait for a disease to develop before filing suit. An
increased risk cause of action will not be discovered until a risk assessment
establishes the person's enhanced probability of future disease.66 The
specialized nature and expense of such a study renders the increased risk
injury not reasonably discoverable. 67As under the extent of the injury rule,
plaintiffs would have a choice. They could make the extraordinary effort to
determine if they have a present cause of action for increased risk, or wait
until after a disease develops to seek judicial relief.
IV. RECOVERY FOR INCREASED RISK-THE INSURANCE
POLICY REMEDY
Recognition of increased risk claims presents peculiar remedy problems.
This section describes the limitations of a monetary award for an increased
risk cause of action and recommends an insurance policy remedy for this
unique injury.
Judicial relief for the hazardous waste victim must address two prob-
lems. First, persons who are at risk of developing future diseases face
immediate out-of-pocket expenses that deserve compensation. 68 Second,
those who develop a disease after exposure to toxic substances have little
hope of financial recovery.69
A traditional monetary award can adequately compensate hazardous
waste victims for the specialized medical testing necessary for monitoring
the development of cancer and other latent illnesses. Damages can also
provide redress for emotional distress resulting from a reasonable fear of
cancer.70 However, ajury award is not the appropriate remedy for the future
65. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
66. This assumes that courts establish quantification of risk as a necessary element of the cause of
action, see supra note 64, and adopt the discovery rule for statutes of limitation. See supra notes 8, 38.
67. See supra notes 17-19.
68. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
70. Separate claims for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress as a result of
exposure to toxic substances are recognized by several courts. See, e.g., Wetherill v. University of
Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1560-61 (N.D. 111. 1983) (emotional distress damages award based on
failure to warn); Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 461 A.2d 184, 188-89 (1983);
Arnett v. Dow Chemical Co., No. 729586, slip op. at 24-26 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Francisco County
Mar. 21, 1983). However, some courts impose severe limitations that effectively prevent such relief.
See, e.g., Plummer v. Abbott Laboratories, 568 F. Supp. 920, 925 (D.R.I. 1983) (no recovery for
emotional distress without accompanying symptomatology); Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass.
540, 437 N.E.2d 171, 176 (1982) (absent extreme and outrageous conduct, plaintiff must demonstrate
physical harm); see also Note, DES and Emotional Distress, Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 37 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 151 (1982); Annot. 71 A.L.R.2d 338 (1960) (anxiety as to future disease as an element of
damages); Gale, supra note 4, at 15-35.
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consequences of a latent disease.
Juries have compensated plaintiffs for possible future diseases by weigh-
ing the magnitude and probability of the potential harm. 71 If the probability
is low, however, plaintiffs are likely to be under-compensated, 72 par-
ticularly when there is no separate claim for mental distress or other present
injuries. 73 On the other hand, jury sympathy for the toxic tort victim could
lead to over-compensation. 74 Jury discretion could be limited by applying a
proportional recovery approach, recommended by some commentators. 75
Under the proportional recovery approach, the court fixes the percentage
of future damages to be awarded by the probability of disease formation. 76
This limitation is favored because it is "actuarially fair." Tortfeasors pay
the full cost of damages that they have caused. 77 To the individual haz-
ardous waste victim, however, it is either grossly unfair or overly generous.
71. See M. Mu~znx , supra note 15, at § 13.02 and cases cited therein.
72. For example, in the case In re Three Mile Island Litigation, No. 79-0763 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 27,
1982), the plaintiffs were entitled to a trial for damages arising from an increased risk of cancer due to
radiation exposure. At trial, however, the defendants estimated that the exposure had increased the risk
by only 0.0001%. Kanner, supra note 4, at 384.
73. In cases tried under the extent of the injury rule, the courts have emphasized the severe
emotional trauma associated with the risk in upholding large damage awards. In Davis v. Graviss, 672
S.W.2d 928, 931 (Ky. 1984), a $224,500 award for mental and physical suffering was not considered
excessive because:
appellant is left to twist in the wind every day of her life as to whether she ought to have the
operation or whether she ought to run the risk that if she gets a common cold it may get into her
spinal fluid and lead to meningitis or worse.
Id. at 931;see also Martin v. City of New Orleans, 678 F.2d 1321, 1327 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1203 (1983). Hence, without a claim for emotional distress, compensation for increased risk of
future disease would likely be minimal.
74. In toxic tort cases, attorneys are often viewed as "representing" a Fortune 500 monolith pitted
against a "hard-working, church-going family man, a loving husband and father. . . . [A] clever
plaintiff's attorney will increase the jury's empathy for his client in direct proportion to a defendant's
assent up the Fortune 500 ladder." Goggin & Brophy, Toxic Torts: Workable DefensesAvailable To The
Corporate Defendant, 28 ViiL. L. REv. 1208, 1214 (1983). When plantiffs are suing because of their
increased risk of cancer, ajury is likely to be even more sympathetic. See Shelton, Defending Cancer
Litigation: The Causation Defense, 24 FOR DER 8, 11 (1982).
75. See, e.g., Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 20, at 782.
76. Proportional recovery has generally been suggested where a plaintiff develops a disease but
must use epidemiological evidence to prove causation. Id. However, it is equally applicable in the
context of future damage compensation. See King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal
Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1396
(1981); Delgado, supra note 4, at 900-01.
Proportional damage awards have occurred in indeterminant defendant litigation and have been
proposed in loss of chance cases. See, e.g., Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wn. 2d 581, 606, 689
P.2d 368,383 (1984); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of PugetSound, 99 Wn. 2d 609,635,664 P.2d
474, 487 (1983).
77. Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 20, at 783 (citing Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law:
Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713, 747 (1982)). But see Kaye, The Limits of the
Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causa-
tion, 1982 AM. B. FouND. REsEARCH J. 487, 491.
649
Washington Law Review Vol. 60:635, 1985
Those who develop a disease receive a fraction of their medical costs, lost
wages, and nonpecuniary damages arising from the defendant's tortious
conduct,78 while others receive a windfall. 79
The better approach to judicial relief is an award of insurance coverage to
plaintiffs exposed to hazardous waste. 80 Insurance provides future mone-
tary relief to plaintiffs who develop a latent illness, and gives an immediate
psychological benefit to exposed plaintiffs who would be covered finan-
cially against catastrophic future illnesses.
Plaintiffs would request an insurance policy remedy as equitable relief in
addition to compensation for out-of-pocket expenses and other present
injuries. 81 A judge would order defendants to purchase an insurance
package for exposed plaintiffs. These policies would be structured to pay
medical treatment costs if and when a designated disease developed, 82 and
provide supplemental income should plaintiffs become unable to work as a
result of the disease. The policy would also compensate the victims'
successors if the plaintiffs died from a designated illness.
This remedy avoids the problems of under-compensation and over-
compensation arising from a money judgment. 83 Instead, it offers plaintiffs
78. Increased risk judgments under the proportional recovery approach will not adequately offset
the costs of cancer if it develops. Comment, Increased Risk, supra note 4, at 581-82.
79. Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 883.
80. Persons living near hazardous waste sites want insurance coverage for future diseases. See
Distrust Leaches Out Over Stringfellow Studies, CHEMICAL WEEK, Apr. 27, 1983, at 26. 28. Insurance
options have also been suggested in lieu of individual lump sum cash awards in the $180 million agent
orange settlement. In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation, M.D.L. No. 381, slip op. at
350-51 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1984) (preliminary memorandum and order on settlement). A contingent
injury fund was proposed for nuclear power industry employees for latent injuries from exposure to
radiation. Estep, supra note 4, at 281.
81. An insurance fund judgment would be most appropriate in a class action by risk claimants filed
immediately upon discovery of mass exposure. Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 920. This remedy could also
be sought by an individual plaintiff. The size of the insured class may affect the premiums charged, but
not the feasibility of the remedy.
82. A list of diseases covered by insurance would be developed from existing scientific studies
associating certain illnesses with the chemicals to which the plaintiffs have been exposed. See, e.g., In
re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation, M.D.L. No. 381, slip op. at 381 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25.
1984) (compensation may be limited to designated diseases); see also supra note 5.
A designated disease may be caused by factors other than the defendant's waste. To address this issue,
some have suggested prorating insurance benefits according to the probability of causation by the
defendant. See Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 921. However, this raises the problems associated with
proportional recovery. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. The burden of proof could be shifted
to the defendant or insurance company to prove the lack of causation, as in Allen v. United States, 588 F.
Supp. 247, 415 (D. Utah 1984), but this would significantly reduce the certainty of the insurance
judgment. No reduction in benefits will be needed if the exposed population is relatively small and the
compensable illnesses are precisely determined, because the defendant will face a minimal economic
burden.
83. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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protection from the risk they face. Even if plaintiffs have adequate insur-
ance, this remedy provides additional relief, just as a damage award may
compensate an accident victim who is already covered by insurance.
An insurance judgment is a fair remedy. Plaintiffs are provided compen-
sation if and when it is needed, but share in the chance that a disease may
not develop. Defendants under the insurance approach face approximately
the same liability as under a proportional recovery system, since insurance
premiums will be based on the same determination of risk. 84 Defendants
might also benefit financially by being allowed to spread the costs of
insurance over the latency period of the designated illnesses. 85
Although the insurance industry has not favored recent toxic tort reform
proposals, 86 the insurance approach proposed in this Comment is likely to
be met with greater acceptance. 87 The principal interest of insurance
companies with regard to any hazardous waste victim compensation sys-.
tern is the predictability of costs. 88 Under the proposed insurance remedy,
policies would be written for a known group of individuals who face a
known risk of future disease.89 This will allow premiums to be set with
reasonable certainty.90 Uncertainties as to which insurer is responsible for
84. Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 920.
85. See id. (suggesting use of annuities). Safeguards would be needed to ensure that defendants
continue to paypremiums. Pre-paid insurance policies, while imposing greatercosts, may be preferable
because they provide greater certainty to plaintiffs.
86. See, e.g., Implementation of the Superfund Program, Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Transp., and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. 126 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Hearings] (statement of Sheila L. Birnbaum, representing
American Insurance Association); Cheek, supra note 4, at 10,124 (insurance companies oppose all
pending legislative victim compensation proposals because of unpredictable costs).
87. Legislation may be required to permit issuance of such policies. Letter from Richard L.
Roddis, Chief Executive Officer of Unigard Insurance Group, to the author (February 25, 1985) (copy
on file with the Washington Law Review).
88. Hearings, supra note 86, at 139 (statement of Leslie Cheek).
89. This is similar to policies now issued for Environmental Impairment Liability (EIL) insurance.
Before EIL insurance is issued, a risk assessment is performed to define the area of potential liability,
including identification of those individuals who may be injured by discharges. Wrerm, The Use ofRisk
Assessment in Insurance, Real Estate andMerger Decisions, in ALI-ABA MAERLAS, supra note 1, at
481-83.
Both the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1982 & Supp. 11983), and
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),
42 U.S.C. § 9607(k) (1982 & Supp. 11983), require businesses handling hazardous waste to purchase
EIL insurance or demonstrate financial responsibility for possible claims. See Licata, Pollution
Insurance as a Regulatory Tool, 3 ENVrL. F. 43, 45-46 (1984); ENVmONmENTAL PRomtEION, supra
note I, at 563-66, 578-80. However, neither existing statutes nor proposed amendments provide an
insurance remedy for the increased risk victim. See id.; Light, supra note 10, at 10,139 (proposals
relying on existing state law to provide recovery for risk victim).
90. Setting appropriate premiums requires reasonable certainty as to the number of persons who
will make claims and the average claim cost. Hearings, supra note 86, at 139 (statement of Leslie
Cheek).
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paying benefits or what activities are covered would also be avoided. 91
An insurance remedy is far from the standard approach to tort compensa-
tion. However, as plaintiffs realize the limited potential for damage awards,
they will seek court-ordered insurance judgments. 92 The courts should
grant this type of relief because of the unique nature of the increased risk
injury, the inadequacy of damage awards, and the inherent fairness of this
remedy. 93
V. CONCLUSION
Judicial relief for increased risk of disease from exposure to hazardous
waste is not possible under current tort doctrine. Yet, postponing legal
action until the manifestation of a disease is impractical and unfair. To
avoid the harsh results of the current doctrine, two approaches are pro-
posed.
First, courts can recognize cellular or genetic damage caused by toxic
substances as a present injury. A remedy for that injury, including possible
future complications, can be granted under the extent of the injury rule.
This alternative will only help victims demonstrating present physiological
effects.
The better solution, one that provides relief to all persons at risk of
developing future disease from exposure to hazardous waste, is to recog-
nize increased risk alone as actionable injury. An increased risk claim
provides important practical benefits and is supported by analogous tort
principles.
The remedy granted for an increased risk cause of action should include
both a monetary award for medical monitoring costs and emotional distress
damages, and an award of insurance coverage. An insurance policy remedy
avoids problems of valuation, under-compensation, and over-compensa-
tion inherent in a lump-sum judgment, and spreads the risk of future
damages more equitably between the parties.
Brent Carson
91. See Kircher, Federal Products Legislation and Toxic Torts: The Defense Perspective, 28 VILL.
L. REV. 1116, 1136-41 (1983) (discussing conflicting court decisions on whether insurance benefits must
be paid and who pays them).
92. Similarly, defendants may use the insurance remedy as a settlement device, rather than face a
hostile jury. Cf Sedgwick & Judge, The Use ofAnnuities in Settlement of Personal Injury Cases, 41 INs.
CouNs. J. 584, 584 (1974) (proposing annuities as a settlement tool).
93. Cf RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 359-60 (1979) (describing factors considered
for obtaining specific performance including inadequacy of damages, unique nature of contract, and
basic equities).
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